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Abstract
This paper supplies two possible resolutions of Fortune’s (2000) margin-
loan pricing puzzle. Fortune (2000) noted that the margin loan interest rates
charged by stock brokers are very high in relation to the actual (low) credit
risk and the cost of funds. If we live in the Black-Scholes world, the brokers are
presumably making arbitrage profits by shorting dynamically precise amounts
of their clients’ portfolios.
First, we extend Fortune’s (2000) application of Merton’s (1974) no-arbitrage
approach to allow for brokers that can only revise their hedges finitely many
times during the term of the loan. We show that extremely small differences in
the revision frequency can easily explain the observed variation in margin loan
pricing. In fact, four additional revisions per three-day period serve to
explain all of the currently observed heterogeneity.
Second, we study monopolistic (or oligopolistic) margin loan pricing by
brokers whose clients are continuous-time Kelly gamblers. The broker solves
a general stochastic control problem that yields simple and pleasant formulas
for the optimal interest rate and the net interest margin. If the author owned
a brokerage, he would charge an interest rate of (r + ν)/2 − σ2/4, where r is
the cost of funds, ν is the compound-annual growth rate of the S&P 500 index,
and σ is the volatility.
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1 Introduction
Anyone who has used a significant amount of margin debt is well aware that stock
brokers in the United States differ widely in the interest rates they charge their clients
on such loans. In addition to this heterogeneity, Fortune (2000) noted the puzzling
fact that margin rates are very high in relation to the actual (low) credit risk and
the cost of funds. For one thing, U.S. law caps the initial loan-to-value ratio on such
debt at 50%. For another, U.S. brokerage customers who use margin debt will (in
the aggregate) hold very liquid, high-quality collateral (e.g. the market portfolio).
Even if market fluctuations cause some accounts to have negative equity, in practice
customers will often respond to margin calls by depositing additional funds into the
account. The broker’s low risk is underscored by the fact that there is an organized
market for funding for such loans. As of this writing (September 2018) the “broker
call rate” is r = 3.75%, a mere 86 basis points above the 5-year Treasury yield.
Not only is the credit risk low, but certainly brokers also have the wherewithal
to hedge some or all of it away, albeit at the cost of lower expected profits. In the
Black-Scholes (1973) world, assuming that the client’s portfolio follows a geometric
Brownian motion, the broker could eliminate risk by shorting a precise, continuously
revised amount of the client’s holdings. The cost of delta-hedging would eat into
the net interest margin, but the broker would be guaranteed a riskless profit without
using any of his own capital. Fortune (2000) showed that, even assuming that stocks
follow jump diffusions with very high volatility, Merton’s (1974) no-arbitrage analysis
fails to rationalize the observed margin rates.
In the Black-Scholes world, if the broker can continuously monitor the client’s
portfolio for solvency, then the no-arbitrage axiom implies that the price of margin
debt must equal the cost of funds. Because of the continuous sample paths, there is
no default risk, as the broker can liquidate an account the instant its equity equals
zero (or some other threshold). For example, Interactive Brokers (which offers the
lowest available margin rates) behaves in just this way. Thus, a risk premium R > r
obtains only if the portfolio is unmonitored over some fixed loan term, T . Outside
of major panics, the practical default risk comes from leveraged portfolios that are
held overnight or over the weekend. Hence, a reasonable value of T should not exceed
three calendar days.
Section 2 extends Fortune’s (2000) analysis to model brokers that can only revise
their hedges finitely many times over the loan term. Instead of exact, continuous
hedging, the broker is now assumed to super-hedge (or super-replicate) his liability
on a “filled-in” binomial lattice at N discrete points in time. This framework ac-
comodates very general price dynamics, as the gross-return S(t + ∆t)/S(t) may be
distributed over [d, u] in any manner whatsoever. A super-hedge, as defined by Ben-
said, Lesne, Pages, and Scheinkman (1992), is a trading strategy, together with an
initial deposit of money, that guarantees to make no loss for all possible market be-
havior. The super-hedging cost (or super-hedging price) of a contingent claim is the
lowest possible monetary deposit that (together with some special trading strategy)
produces cash flows that dominate the derivative payoff. In our particular problem, as
N increases, the broker is able to lower the rate it charges on margin loans, while still
being able to guarantee no loss. As N →∞, the broker’s short position converges to
the one specified by the Black-Scholes (∆-hedging) strategy, and the broker’s margin
rate converges to the rate studied by Fortune (2000). We show that for a loan term of
T = 3 days, the only distinguishing feature of the lowest-cost broker is that it is able
to revise its short position an additional four times. The difference between 15 and 19
revisions is enough to explain all the heterogeneity observed among U.S. investment
brokerages.
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Section 3 studies the optimal behavior of a broker whose customers are continuous-
time Kelly gamblers (Luenberger 1998). By contrast to the Markowitz (1952) mean-
variance theory of investing, a Kelly (1956) gambler eschews the tangency portfolio
(of maximum Sharpe ratio) in exchange for an asymptotically dominant trading strat-
egy that has the maximum expected continuously-compounded (read: logarithmic)
growth rate. It is well known (Breiman 1961) that in the long-run, with probability
approaching 1, the Kelly rule outperforms any “essentially different” strategy by an
exponential factor. A Kelly gambler who uses leverage will happen to maintain a cer-
tain (fixed) loan-to-value ratio at all times, which ratio depends on the quality of the
available investment opportunities. Since the Kelly gamblers at a given brokerage will
hold asymptotically 100% of the wealth, they will also owe 100% of all margin debt in
the limit. Thus, we assume that the Kelly gambler’s broker acts as a monopolist over
margin loans in the context of a permanent, infinite-horizon interaction. The broker
solves a general stochastic control problem that yields simple and pleasant formulas
for the optimal interest rate and the net interest margin.
2 Arbitrage pricing
We start by describing Fortune’s (2000) no-arbitrage method, which is a straight
application of Merton (1974). Suppose that a client borrows D dollars at t = 0 to
finance the purchase of a single share of stock for S0. The initial account equity is
E0 = S0 −D. The stock price St is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
dSt/St = µ dt+ σ dWt, (1)
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where µ is the drift, σ is the volatility, and Wt is a unit Brownian motion. Assume
that the risk-free rate (“broker call rate”) is r, and that the broker charges interest
at a continuously-compounded rate of R per year. At time t, the client’s equity
is Et = St − DeRt. If the account is continuously monitored for solvency, then the
broker can liquidate the account the instant that Et = 0. Thus, under continuous
monitoring, no-arbitrage considerations dictate that R = r.
To rationalize a margin rate R > r, we must assume that the broker will not check
for solvency until some future time T . If ET ≥ 0, then the debt of DeRT dollars will
be paid in full. Otherwise, the client will abandon the account, leaving the broker
with collateral worth ST . Assuming that the broker borrowed the initial D dollars on
the money market at the risk-free rate, the broker’s final profit (loss) is
piT = min(ST , De
RT )−DerT . (2)
Using the fact that max(x, y) + min(x, y) = x+ y, and rearranging, we get
piT = ST +De
RT −DerT −max(ST , DeRT ) = ST −DerT −max(ST −DeRT , 0). (3)
Thus, the client has in effect exchanged his initial equity E0 for a call on one share
of the stock, at the strike price K = DeRT . To rule out arbitrage opportunities, the
expected present value of piT at t = 0 with respect to the risk-neutral measure must
be zero:
E0 = S0 −D = C(S0, 0;DeRT ), (4)
where C is the time-0 price of a European call maturing at T with strike price K =
DeRT . Thus, no-arbitrage dictates the sensible requirement that the initial exchange
(of equity E0 for the call) be actuarially fair. Fortune (2000) notes that observed
4
Figure 1: The implied time between solvency checks, for different mar-
gin rates. r = 0.035, σ = 0.4, S0 = 100, D = 50. (The observed margin rates
are from May 2018)
interest rates on margin debt are far higher than no-arbitrage considerations would
seem to dictate. However, he does not specify the particular horizon T that was used
in his study. As Figure 1 illustrates, in order to rationalize the current margin rates
charged by different brokers in (May) 2018, we must admit horizons of up to three
years. In reality, these brokers check for solvency on a weekly or even daily basis.
We have used the sample values r = 0.035, σ = 0.4, S0 = 100, D = 50. Note that an
initial loan-to-value ratio of D/S0 = 50% is the maximum allowed by U.S. law.
2.1 Super-hedging on a “filled-in” binomial lattice
If we live in the Black-Scholes (1973) world, then we must conclude that that either:
(1) retail brokers are making large arbitrage profits on margin loans, or (2) these
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brokers wait months or years before issuing margin calls. Neither explanation is
particularly satisfactory. And in reality, the situation is even more favorable to the
brokers than the model would suggest, because many clients will deposit additional
funds instead of abandoning their insolvent accounts. In the United States, of course,
defaulting on margin debt results in adverse legal action and negative credit reports.
However, we will show below that seemingly minor differences in brokers’ abilities
to hedge their risks can result in substantial differences in the margin rates they can
safely charge. To illustrate these effects, we consider a “filled-in” binomial lattice
model of stock dynamics. We assume the broker subdivides the interval [0, T ] into
N subintervals of length ∆t = T/N each. We match the binomial lattice parameters
u, d to the geometric Brownian motion in the standard way (Luenberger 1998): let
u = eσ
√
∆t and d = 1/u. Unlike the usual binomial {u, d} lattice, we will allow the
price relative S(t+ ∆t)/S(t) to take on any value between d and u. Apart from the
restriction that S(t + ∆t)/S(t) ∈ [d, u], we will make no additional assumptions on
the price process St. For instance, it would be permissible for S(t+ ∆t)/S(t) to have
a uniform distribution (or any other distribution) over the interval [d, u].
Following Ritchken and Kuo (1988), the no-arbitrage price of a call on this filled-in
lattice cannot exceed the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (1979) price
N∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
qj(1− q)N−j max(S0ujdN−j −K), (5)
where K is the strike price and q is the risk-neutral probability. Using this upper
bound, the present value at t = 0 of the broker’s arbitrage profit (loss) is at least
S0 −D −
N∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
qj(1− q)N−j max(S0u2j−N −DeRT , 0), (6)
6
Figure 2: The number of revisions needed to guarantee no loss at dif-
ferent margin rates. r = 0.035, σ = 0.4, T = 3/365, S0 = 100, D = 50.
where q = (er∆t− d)/(u− d) is the risk-neutral probability of an uptick. As N →∞,
this number converges (Cox and Rubinstein 1985) to S0 − D − C(S0, 0;K), where
C(S0, 0;K) is the Black-Scholes (1973) price. The highest rational price R that can
be charged by a broker with the ability to make N revisions over [0, T ] is characterized
by the equation
S0 −D =
N∑
j=0
(
N
j
)
qj(1− q)N−j max(S0u2j−N −DeRT , 0) . (7)
For each possible interest rate R > r, let N(R) be the smallest number of revisions
for which the broker can guarantee an arbitrage profit. Figure 2 plots N(R) for
r = 0.035, σ = 0.4, T = 3/365, S0 = 100, and D = 50. Note well that for a three-
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day margin loan, very small changes in the frequency with which the broker is able
to revise his (super) hedge will generate wide discrepancies in the margin rates the
broker can profitably charge. Four additional revisions within a three-day period
are enough to explain the difference between one broker who charges 4 percent and
another who must charge 8 or 9 percent in order to guarantee no loss. To reiterate,
we find that four additional revisions per three-day period suffice to explain
all of the currently observed heterogeneity in margin loan pricing.
3 Margin loans to Kelly gamblers
3.1 Instantaneous demand
We take up the general stock market with n correlated stocks i ∈ {1, ..., n} in geo-
metric Brownian motion, where the price Sit of stock i evolves according to
dSit/Sit = µi dt+ σi dWit. (8)
µi and σi are the drift and volatility, respectively, of stock i, and W1t, ...,Wnt are
correlated unit Brownian motions. We let ρij = Corr(dWit, dWjt) and σij = ρijσiσj =
Cov(dSit/Sit, dSjt/Sjt)/dt. Σ = [σij]n×n is the covariance matrix of instantaneous
returns per unit time. Let rL be the interest rate the broker charges on margin loans,
and let r be the cost of funds (the money-market rate).
We assume that the broker’s sole customer is a Kelly (1956) gambler who follows
a constant rebalancing rule b = (b1, ..., bn)
′ ∈ Rn. This means that, at every instant t,
the trader bets the fraction bi of his wealth on stock i. We let Vt(b) denote the trader’s
wealth at t. If
n∑
i=1
bi ≥ 1, then the trader has taken a margin loan of
( n∑
i=1
bi − 1
)
Vt(b)
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dollars. If
n∑
i=1
bi ≤ 1, then the trader has cash deposit of
(
1 −
n∑
i=1
bi
)
Vt(b) dollars. If
bi < 0, then the trader has a short position in stock i. The gambler must continuously
rebalance his portfolio so as to maintain the target allocation b. At instant t, he holds
biVt(b)/Sit shares of stock i. Thus, the client’s wealth follows the geometric Brownian
motion
dVt(b)/Vt(b) =
{ n∑
i=1
biµi −max
( n∑
i=1
bi − 1, 0
)
rL + max
(
1−
n∑
i=1
bi, 0
)
r
}
dt
+
n∑
i=1
biσidWit. (9)
Note that there is no default risk, since a geometric Brownian motion is always
positive. Money that is borrowed at t gets repaid with interest at t + dt, and then
the trader borrows again. Letting B =
n∑
i=1
bi and µ = (µ1, ..., µn)
′, we get the concise
expression
dVt/Vt = α dt+
n∑
i=1
biσidWit, (10)
where α = µ′b − (B − 1)+rL + (1 − B)+r is the drift of the gambler’s wealth, and
x+ , max(x, 0) denotes the positive part of x. Applying Itoˆ’s Lemma for several
diffusion processes (Wilmott 2001), we obtain
Vt = V0 · exp
{
(α− b′Σb/2)t+
n∑
i=1
biσiWit
}
. (11)
The trader’s asymptotic growth rate is
lim
t→∞
log(Vt/V0)/t = lim
t→∞
{
α− b′Σb/2 + 1
t
n∑
i=1
biσiWit
}
= α− b′Σb/2. (12)
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Definition 1. The Kelly rule (or growth-optimal rebalancing rule) is
b∗ = arg max
b∈Rn
{α(b)− b′Σb/2}. (13)
The maximum asymptotic growth rate is called the Kelly growth rate.
Proposition 1. The growth rate Γ(b) = α(b)− b′Σb/2 is concave over Rn.
Proof. Since Σ is positive semidefinite, the term µ′b − b′Σb/2 is concave. Thus, it
suffices to show that (1−B)+r− (B−1)+rL is concave in B, since the linear transfor-
mation B =
n∑
i=1
bi will preserve the concavity. To achieve this, we add and subtract
(1−B)+rL to get
(1−B)+(r− rL) + [(1−B)+ − (B − 1)+]rL = (1−B)+(r− rL) + (1−B)rL. (14)
Since r− rL < 0 and (1−B)+ is convex in B, we have the sum of a concave function
and a linear function, and the result follows.
Figure 3 gives a typical plot of (1− B)+r − (B − 1)+rL. Figure 4 gives a typical
plot of the growth rate Γ(b) for leveraged bets on a single high-quality stock or index.
Proposition 2. If the trader uses margin debt, his rebalancing rule will be b∗ =
Σ−1(µ − rL1), where 1 is an n × 1 vector of ones. If the trader holds positive cash
balances, his bets will be b∗ = Σ−1(µ − r1). If the trader’s net cash position is zero,
he will use the portfolio b∗ = Σ−1(µ− λ1), where λ = (1′Σ−1µ− 1)/1′Σ−11.
Proposition 3. Let λ = (1′Σ−1µ − 1)/1′Σ−11. The trader will use margin debt if
and only if rL < λ. The trader will hold a positive cash balance if and only if λ < rD.
The trader’s net cash position will be zero if and only if rD ≤ λ ≤ rL.
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Figure 3: Plot of (1−B)+r − (B − 1)+rL for r = 0.01 and rL = 0.06.
Corollary 1. At time t, the trader’s demand for margin debt is
q = Vt(b)[1
′Σ−1µ− 1− (1′Σ−11)rL] = Vt(b)(1′Σ−11)(λ− rL) = C −DrL, (15)
where C = Vt(b)(1
′Σ−1µ− 1) and D = Vt(b)1′Σ−11.
Corollary 2. The elasticity of the continuous-time Kelly gambler’s demand for mar-
gin debt is given by
 =
rL
λ− rL , (16)
where λ is the shadow price of margin debt.
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Figure 4: Growth rates for different bets b on one stock, σ = 0.2, ν =
0.09, µ = ν + σ2/2, rL = 0.03. The kink is at b = 1, and the Kelly rule is
b∗ = 2. Overbetting (b > 2) is insane, since it entails a lower growth
rate and more risk.
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3.2 Monopoly pricing
We assume that the broker acts monopolistically, with instantaneous profit
pi(rL) = D(λ− rL)(rL − r). (17)
Differentiating, we have the first-order condition
(λ− rL)− (rL − r) = 0. (18)
Thus, the monopoly price of margin debt (for clients who are continuous-time Kelly
gamblers) is
rL =
r + λ
2
=
r + (1′Σ−1µ− 1)/1′Σ−11
2
. (19)
Example 1. For a single stock with drift µ, volatility σ, and growth rate ν = µ−σ2/2,
the monopoly price of margin debt is
r∗L =
r + µ− σ2
2
=
r + ν
2
− σ2/4 (20)
and the net interest margin is rL − r = (ν − r)/2 − σ2/4. Thus, the interest rate is
increasing in r but the net interest margin is decreasing in r. As the asset becomes
more attractive (higher growth rate and less volatility), the interest rate increases.
Example 2. For the values r = 0.035, ν = 0.09, σ = 0.25, a monopolistic broker
should charge 4.7% margin interest.
Example 3. Assume there are two stocks with correlation ρ = 0.5, both having the
the compound-growth rate ν = 0.09 and volatility σ = 0.25, with the money market
rate being r = 0.035. The broker should charge 5.47% interest on margin loans.
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3.3 Cournot pricing
More generally, we can consider margin loans supplied by N oligopolistic brokers in
Cournot competition. The inverse aggregate demand curve is rL = λ−Q/D, where
Q =
N∑
i=1
qi is the aggregate quantity of margin loans, and qi is broker i’s quantity.
Broker i’s profit is
pii(q1, ..., qN) = qi(λ− r − qi/D −Q−i/D), (21)
where Q−i =
∑
j 6=i
qj is the aggregate quantity supplied by i’s competitors. Broker i’s
first-order condition is
λ− r −Q/D − qi/D = 0. (22)
In the (symmetric) Cournot equilibrium, all brokers supply the same quantity qi ≡ q,
and we have Q = Nq. Thus, we have
q =
D(λ− r)
N + 1
Q =
ND(λ− r)
N + 1
rL =
Nr + λ
N + 1
rL − r = λ− r
N + 1
Π = ND
(
λ− r
N + 1
)2
,
(23)
where Π is the aggregate profit and rL − r is the net interest margin.
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3.4 Risk-averse broker with an infinite horizon
In this subsection, we model the broker as a risk-averse monopolist with an infinite
horizon. We let e−βt denote the broker’s discount factor, and we let pit denote the
instantaneous rate of profit per unit time. Thus, the broker picks an interest rate rL
that solves
max
rL∈(r,λ)
E0
{ ∞∫
0
e−βt log pit dt
}
, (24)
where pit = Vt(b)(1
′Σ−11)(λ − rL)(rL − r) and b = Σ−1(µ − rL1) is the client’s
continuously-rebalanced portfolio. After simplification and monotonic transforma-
tion, the (concave) objective function becomes
U(rL) = β log
[
(λ− rL)(rL − r)
]
+ α− b′Σb/2
= β log
[
(λ− rL)(rL − r)
]
+ rL +
1
2
(µ− rL1)′Σ−1(µ− rL1).
(25)
The broker’s first-order condition is
1′Σ−11(λ− rL)2(rL − r) = 2β
(
r + λ
2
− rL
)
. (26)
Proposition 4. If the broker is a risk-averse monopolist with an infinite horizon,
then it always sets a margin rate that lower than the instantaneous monopoly price
(r + λ)/2.
Proof. Since the left-hand side of the first-order condition (26) is positive, the right-
hand side must be positive as well. This yields rL < (r + λ)/2.
Proposition 5. The broker’s margin rate is strictly increasing in the discount rate
(drL/dβ > 0). As β → +∞, the broker’s margin rate r∗L(β) converges to the in-
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stantaneous monopoly rate (r + λ)/2. As β → 0+, the margin rate approaches the
money-market rate r.
Proof. Differentiating the broker’s first-order condition implicitly with respect to β,
we find
drL
dβ
(
1
rL − r −
2
λ− rL +
2
r + λ− 2rL
)
= 1/β. (27)
The expression in parentheses is positive: viz, let x = rL− r, y = λ− rL, where y− x
is positive. We must show that
1/x− 2/y + 2/(y − x) > 0, (28)
which is equivalent to 2x2 + y(y − x) > 0, which is true. Now, as β → +∞, the
left-hand side of (26) is a bounded quantity. Thus, the right-hand side must remain
bounded as well. The only way to avoid contradiction is for rL → (r+λ)/2. Similarly,
as β → 0+, the right-hand side tends to 0. Thus, we must have rL → λ or rL → r.
However, since rL is less than the midpoint of the interval (r, λ), we must have
rL → r.
Corollary 3. For any observed margin rate rL < (r+λ)/2 charged by a given broker,
there is a unique discount rate β that rationalizes rL.
Figure 5 plots r∗L against β for the case of a single stock with σ = 25% annual
volatility that grows at a compound rate of ν = 10% per year. The cost of funds is
assumed to be r = 3.5%.
3.5 The general stochastic control problem
In this subsection, we formulate and solve the general version of the broker’s stochastic
control problem. In so doing, we show that the restriction to constant interest rate
16
Figure 5: Margin rate versus broker’s personal discount rate: n = 1, r =
0.035, ν = 0.1, σ = 0.25.
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policies entails no loss of generality. We now allow the broker’s instantaneous interest
rate rL = rL(Vt) to depend on the customer’s wealth Vt. Thus, the broker chooses a
feedback-control policy rL(Vt) to solve
max
rL(·)
E0
{ ∞∫
0
e−βt log
[
Vt(λ− rL)(rL − r)
]
dt
}
, (29)
under the transition law
dVt/Vt = {rL + (µ− rL1)′Σ−1(µ− rL1)}dt+
n∑
i=1
biσidWit, (30)
where b = Σ−1(µ − rL1) is the customer’s portfolio. Letting J = J(V ) denote the
broker’s maximum value function, we have the HJB equation (Kamien and Schwartz
1981)
βJ(V ) = max
rL
{
log
[
V (λ− rL)(rL − r)
]
+
[
rL + (µ− rL1)′Σ−1(µ− rL1)
]
V J ′(V ) +
1
2
(µ− rL1)′Σ−1(µ− rL1)V 2J ′′(V )
}
.
(31)
We make the guess J(V ) = c1+c2 log V , where c1 and c2 are undetermined coefficients.
After simplification, this turns the HJB equation into
βc1+(βc2−1) log V = max
rL
{
log
[
(λ−rL)(rL−r)
]
+c2
[
rL+
1
2
(µ−rL1)′Σ−1(µ−rL1)
]}
.
(32)
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Since the right-hand side of the HJB equation does not depend on V , we must have
c2 = 1/β. Thus, we get
c1 = max
rL
{
1
β
log
[
(λ− rL)(rL − r)
]
+
1
β2
[
rL +
1
2
(µ− rL1)′Σ−1(µ− rL1)
]}
. (33)
In spite of its complicated form, we have succeeded in expressing c1 solely in terms
of the model parameters β, λ, r, µ, and Σ. The maximizer r∗L, which is independent
of V , is characterized by the first-order condition (26) that we already derived. For
these particular coefficients c1 and c2, substitution of J = c1 + c2 log V turns the HJB
equation into an identity. This proves that the broker’s optimal feedback-control
policy is a constant interest rate r∗L, a rate that solves the maximization problem (33)
above.
4 Conclusion
This paper supplied two possible resolutions of Fortune’s (2000) margin-loan pricing
puzzle. Fortune (2000) pointed out that the observed margin interest rates charged
by stock brokers are very high in relation to the actual (low) credit risk and the
cost of funds. In the Black-Scholes (1973) world, the broker could eliminate risk
by continuously shorting a dynamically precise amount of the customer’s portfolio,
earning substantial arbitrage profits on the margin loan.
First, we extended Fortune’s application of Merton’s (1974) no-arbitrage approach
to alllow for brokers who can only revise their hedges finitely many times over the
term of the loan. We concluded that very small differences in the revision frequency
(say, four extra revisions per 3-day period) can easily explain the wide discrepancies
in observed margin loan interest rates.
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Next, we studied monopolistic (or oligopolistic) margin loan pricing by brokers
whose customers are continuous-time Kelly gamblers (Luenberger 1998). This is a
sensible assumption, since continuous-time Kelly gamblers will asymptotically “crowd
out” the other brokerage customers, holding (in the limit) all of the customer wealth
and shouldering all of the margin debt. The continuous-time Kelly gambler’s in-
stantaneous elasticity of demand for margin loans is  = rL/(λ − rL), where λ =
(1′Σ−1µ − 1)/(1′Σ−11) is the shadow price of a one-dollar margin loan. Here, µ de-
notes the drift vector of the stock market, Σ is the covariance of instantaneous returns
per unit time, and rL is the (continuously-compounded) annual interest rate charged
by the broker. We found that the instantaneous monopoly price of margin debt is
(r + λ)/2, the midpoint of the broker’s cost of funds and the customer’s shadow
value. More generally, under Cournot competition with N brokers, the correct inter-
est rate is the convex combination (Nr + λ)/(N + 1) and the net interest margin is
(λ− r)/(N + 1).
Finally, we modelled the broker as a patient, risk-averse monopolist (with log
utility) on an infinite time-horizon. This led to the cubic equation
1′Σ−11(λ− rL)2(rL − r) = 2β
(
r + λ
2
− rL
)
, (34)
which uniquely characterizes the optimum interest rate rL. Under these assumptions,
we found that the broker always charges a price that is lower than the instantaneous
monopoly price (r + λ)/2. However, as the broker becomes increasingly impatient
(and his discount rate β tends to +∞), his margin rate increases monotonically to the
instantaneous monopoly rate. As the broker gets more patient (β → 0+), his price
converges to the money-market rate r. On account of the unique correspondence
between the broker’s discount rate β and its margin rate rL, we were able to uniquely
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rationalize heterogeneous observed pricing behavior rL ∈
[
r, (r + λ)/2
]
, on the basis
of the brokers’ various levels of impatience to book current profits. To close the
paper, we showed that the broker gets no benefit from conditioning his interest rate
rL = rL(Vt) on the customer’s wealth Vt. We formulated and solved the general
version of the broker’s stochastic control problem, finding that the optimal feedback-
control policy rL(Vt) is to set a constant interest rate r
∗
L, a rate which is characterized
by (34).
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